Futuramas of the present: the “driver problem” in the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary by Braun, Robert & Randell, Richard
ARTICLE
Futuramas of the present: the “driver problem” in
the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary
Robert Braun 1 & Richard Randell 2✉
The visions surrounding “self-driving” or “autonomous” vehicles are an exemplary instance of
a sociotechnical imaginary: visions of a future technology that has yet to be developed or is in
the process of development. One of the central justifications for the development of
autonomous vehicles is the claim that they will reduce automobility related death and injury.
Central to this narrative is the assumption that more than 90% of road crashes are the result
of “driver error.” This paper describes the process by which this statistic has been con-
structed within road safety research and subsequently accepted as a received fact. It is one of
the principal semiotic components of the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary: if
human drivers are responsible for ~90% of road crashes, autonomous vehicles should in
principle be able to reduce road death and injury rates by a similar percentage. In this paper, it
is argued that death and injury are not an aggregate of events that can be distributed across
the three central variables of traditional road safety research: the driver, the vehicle, and the
environment. The autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary has embraced the central
assumption of road safety research, that road violence is not an intrinsic property of auto-
mobility but is contingent because largely due to driver error. On the basis of this assumption
it has been possible to configure autonomous vehicles as the solution to road violence.
Although sociotechnical imaginaries are typically oriented towards the future, it is the sig-
nificance of the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary in the present that is the focus
of this paper. Autonomous vehicles are not the radically transformational technology their
proponents claim but simply the most recent of a succession of automobility sociotechnical
imaginaries. They are not transformational because their promotion ensures the continued
reproduction of more of the same: namely, more automobility.
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“How would you account for this discrepancy between you
and the twin 9000?”
“Well, I don’t think there is any question about it. It can
only be attributable to human error. This sort of thing has
cropped up before, and it has always been due to human
error.”
“Listen HAL. There has never been any instance at all of a
computer error occurring in the 9000 series, has there?”
“None whatsoever, Frank. The 9000 series has a perfect
operational record.”
“Are you certain there has never been any case of even the
most insignificant computer error?”
“None whatsoever, Frank. Quite honestly, I wouldn’t worry
myself about that.”
—2001: A Space Odyssey
The visions surrounding “self-driving” or “autonomous”vehicles are an exemplary instance of a sociotechnicalimaginary as described by Jasanoff and Kim (2009;
Jasanoff, 2015): visions of a future technology that has yet to be
developed or is in the process of development. It is a socio-
technical imaginary co-produced through the efforts of a multi-
plicity of epistemic actors—marketing and advertising agencies,
the academy, states, intergovernmental organizations, transport,
and road safety experts, social and mass media, automobile
manufacturers, and automobiles themselves in the guise of pro-
totypes and concept cars—that are engaged in, either tangentially
or as a primary work task, the process of interpreting, defining,
and predicting the contours of an imagined autonomous auto-
mobility future.1 The autonomous vehicle sociotechnical ima-
ginary is not the first but the most recent of a series of
automobility sociotechnical imaginaries (Curts, 2015; Gundler,
2013; Möser, 2003), each of which predicted a utopic automobile
future, none of which came to pass as envisaged and promised.
Nor is the current autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary
the first autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary (Kidd,
1956; Braun, 2019). Automobility, to borrow the metaphor used
to name the Norman Bel Geddes exhibit at the General Motors
pavilion at the 1939/1940 New York World’s Fair, is a continuous
“Futurama” (Jam Handy Organization, 1940).
Arguments for an autonomous mobility future revolve pri-
marily around increased road safety and secondarily congestion
reduction, as well as other potential benefits such as travel cost
reduction and increased parking space (Litman, 2019; Fagnant
and Kockelman, 2015).2 In this paper we focus on the claim that a
technological solution to one of the intractable problems of
automobility, namely death and injury, has been found (Sparrow
and Howard, 2017). Central to the increased traffic safety nar-
rative is the frequently cited statistic that 93% of automobile
“accidents” are due to human error (Treat et al., 1979; Singh,
2018).3 If the human driver can be replaced with a computer—or
described slightly differently, if the car–driver hybrid entity
(Randell, 2017; Urry, 2006) can be substituted with a computer-
controlled robot within which humans can be transported—death
and injury rates could in principle be reduced by ~90% (Fagnant
and Kockelman, 2015, p. 173). We argue that this claim is based
on a mistaken premise. It is mistaken not because the predicted
reduction in percentage is questionable on its own terms (Favarò
et al., 2018), or because of the specific ethical questions that have
been raised in respect to autonomous vehicles (Himmelreich,
2018), or because road death and injury can and does occur for
reasons not related to accidents (Balkmar, 2018; Sorin, 2020; Seo,
2019). It is mistaken because the ostensible problem in need of a
solution, namely human error as the primary cause of accidents,
is a technologically deterministic construct. It is a construct that
originates in the codebooks, data collection, and analytical pro-
cedures of accident causation methodologies. This statistical
construct is the central justification for moving towards an
autonomous vehicle transport future.
There is an accumulating body of critical social scientific
research that has questioned the optimistic claims made on behalf
of autonomous vehicle technologies (Braun, 2019; Stilgoe, 2018).
The crux of these arguments is that autonomous vehicles are
primarily social, not technological, artefacts and must be so
conceptualized; that roads are social spaces that cannot be ade-
quately understood within an engineering discourse; that objects
such as automobiles are not simply technologies that operate
within or inside a social context but that the social, as in the case
of all technologies, is intrinsic to and inseparable from the
technology (Latour, 2005, p. 5). The disagreement with propo-
nents of autonomous vehicle technologies is over the probable
accuracy of their visions of the future and the desirability of that
future, not just because the visions might not come to pass as
imagined, but because the very vision is problematic, not least
because of the complex ethical issues these vehicles raise.
Employing also the concept of a sociotechnical imaginary, Miloš
Mladenović et al. (2020), for example, are critical of the optimistic
assumptions embedded in the autonomous mobility socio-
technical imaginary and point to tensions in the meaning making
processes between governance and engineering as opposed to
citizen-focused narratives. Similarly, Antonia Graf and Marco
Sonnberger (2020) argue for a citizen focused approach to miti-
gate the potential adverse social impacts of self-driving futures.
The above are all valid concerns, but to focus on the future is to
engage the argument entirely on the terrain of the proponents of
the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary. That terrain is
the future. It is to accept the claim that an autonomous vehicle
future would be a radically different future; the disagreement is
over what that future might look like. Moreover, to focus on the
future is to neglect the significance of the autonomous vehicle
sociotechnical imaginary in the present. As John Urry (2016,
pp. 7–8) has argued, “past, present and future are mutually
intertwined […] The point […] is not to test present assumptions
against some predictive future, but to use the future to question,
unpack, invent what is going on and what can be done within the
present. More generally, […] people’s anticipation of the future
can have profound consequences for the present.” We need, in
other words, to turn from speculation about an unknown future,
to the discourses, visions and desires in the present surrounding
autonomous vehicles. In this paper, we do this by analyzing how
the construct of “the accident” is intertwined with the past, pre-
sent and future of automobility writ large.
An alternative way to describe the autonomous vehicle future is
as simply more of the same: more roads, more cars, more
investment of public resources in automobility infrastructure,
more state aid and automobility subsidies, more negative
externalities, fewer alternative mobility possibilities (Urry, 2004;
Featherstone et al., 2005; Manderscheid, 2014). As with the many
automobility sociotechnical imaginaries of the past, their negative
impacts and the unfulfilled promises of automobility should be
seen not as something that might or might not have contingently
come to pass but as already present within and inseparable from
those sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff, 2015, pp. 4–5). As the
invention of the ship produced the shipwreck (Virilio, 2007), so
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the invention of the automobile produced the automobile “acci-
dent.” Accidents, as Paul Virilio has argued, are not accidental but
are intrinsic to technology. Within the road safety research
paradigm, in contrast, in locating the accident within the
(human) driver the accident has been constructed as extrinsic to
automobility. It is upon the veracity of this assumption that the
autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary has been promoted
as a solution.
In the following section, we briefly outline the central char-
acteristics of the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary; its
relationship to other past and present automobility sociotechnical
imaginaries; how these sociotechnical imaginaries sustain and
reproduce automobility writ large. We then turn to the con-
struction of the problem the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical
imaginary is claimed to solve, which problem is not death and
injury simpliciter; rather the problem has been constructed as “the
driver.” Here we describe how road accident statistics have been
constructed as taken-for-granted established fact; the theoretical,
ethical, empirical, epistemological and metaphysical assumptions
embedded within those statistics; their dissemination, location
and significance within the automobility imaginary; their rheto-
rical and performative characteristics. Through the dissemination
of visions of roads populated by safe, autonomous, computer-
driven vehicles, the sociotechnical imaginary upholds the repro-
duction of automobility by defining counter-visions of an alter-
native future as unnecessary and obsolete. The central premise of
the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary is that risks,
both in terms of general social impacts and as actual traffic cra-
shes, are problems that can be managed through technological
solutions (Mladenović et al., 2020).
The autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary
In a frequently cited passage in the introductory chapter to
Dreamscapes of Modernity: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and the
Fabrication of Power, Jasanoff (2015, p. 4) defines sociotechnical
imaginaries as
collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly
performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared
understandings of forms of social life and social order
attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science
and technology.
Jasanoff and Kim’s concept of a sociotechnical imaginary
serves as a useful starting point for thinking about the public
promotion and marketing of autonomous vehicles. It is a socio-
technical imaginary composed of visions of a desirable future
(Ardente et al., 2019, pp. 60–67); it is institutionally stabilized
through the efforts of private and state actors (McKinsey and
Company, 2013; Bertoncello and Wee, 2015; Aptiv Services US
LLC et al., 2019); it is regularly discussed and analysed in the
mass media and other virtual and physical public spaces (Top-
ham, 2020; Fraedrich and Lenz, 2016); it is represented as a
significant scientific and technological development, thus
appealing to shared positive evaluations of science and technology
(KPMG, 2012).
Automated vehicles are being developed by a complex of large
and small firms, including traditional automobile manufacturers
and component suppliers, such as Robert Bosch AG, as well as
“technology” firms such as Google LLC, Microsoft Corporation
and Intel Corporation. It is these same firms that are promoting
an autonomous vehicle future, as are local, national and supra-
national governments, most notably the US Department of
Transportation (2020) and the European Commission (Alonso
Raposo, 2019; Ardente et al., 2019). In “seeking to realize the
future they envisaged,” as John Urry (2016, p. 9) observed, they
“deploy complex rhetorical imaginaries and visions of a future
‘heaven.’” It is a complex of positive visions that are promoted
and disseminated in newspapers and specialist automotive
magazines, at motor shows (North American International Auto
Show, 2019; Mercedes-Benz, 2020), in academic publications (see,
for example, Lipson and Kurman, 2016; Sumantran et al., 2017;
Wadhwa and Salkever, 2017) and even museum exhibitions. A
recent exhibition entitled “Cars: Accelerating the Modern World”
at the Victoria and Albert Museum—“the world’s leading
museum of art and design”—informs the visitor that “Four trends
promise to completely revolutionize the car…. First, a switch to
electric engines… Secondly, the driverless car…. Third is a shift
from car ownership to on-demand services…. And finally… the
flying car.” These technological developments are represented as
radically different futures, yet it is “the car” that remains (Victoria
and Albert Museum, 2019–2020). Similarly, at the 2019 North
American International Auto Show (Detroit, January 19–27,
2019) prototypes of flying cars were exhibited, while at the
Mercedes Benz pavilion at the 2019 Frankfurt motor show
(Internationale Automobil-Ausstellung, Messe Frankfurt, Sep-
tember 12–22, 2019) autonomous vehicles were presented in a
setting of moving escalators, lighting, visuals and sound that more
than anything else resemble a Disneyland exhibit (see Figs. 1–3,
Supplementary Information). To paraphrase Carl Becker’s (1932)
The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers, these
might be described as visions of the heavenly city of the 21st
century engineers.
The concept of a sociotechnical imaginary is useful precisely
because it provides pointers for mapping this loose network of
institutional power; to ask how power is exercised within and
across this network (Jasanoff, 2015, p. 4) to promote autonomous
vehicles; to identify the diverse agents that are engaged in the task
of persuading us that an autonomous vehicle future is both
superior to existing automobility and a solution to problems that
it has become no longer possible to ignore or deny (Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008; World
Health Organization, 2015); to ask what makes the sociotechnical
imaginary so persuasive. On the basis of their technical knowl-
edge the central actors within this network of institutional sua-
sion that is the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary
assume themselves to be, and so present themselves as, uniquely
qualified to divine the autonomous vehicle automobility future.
The claim to possession of specialized knowledge is the illocu-
tionary force (Austin, 1965) that job titles, professional, academic
and business qualifications, company affiliation and so forth
bestow upon claims makers.
The suasiveness of these visions is achieved through the routine
invocation of the technological and engineering properties of the
vehicles, advances and improvements of which are seen as
desirable for their own sake. That they do so in largely uncritical
terms is not surprising; the alternative would require moving
outside the engineering-business paradigm they inhabit and
within which they work (Kuhn, 1970); more fundamentally, to
question their very raison d’être as promoters of a depoliticized
technological determinism (Mladenović et al., 2020), which is
none other than a future that is presented as natural and inevi-
table. Also relevant here is how constructive critics of the
autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary frame their criti-
cisms, such as thought experiments in the form of the classic
trolley problem. The MIT moral machine experiment (Awad
et al., 2018), for example, addresses the ethical questions of
autonomous driving rather than more general ethical concerns
related to artificial intelligence and machine learning in general
(Basl and Behrends, 2019).
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A recurrent Futurama, sociotechnical imaginaries have been,
and continue to be—from the Model-T Ford, to annual new
models, to fins, to electric, connected and autonomous vehicles
(Norton, 2008)—essential to the continued reproduction of
automobility. Invoking a technologically improved future
embedded in justificatory technological determinism (Mlade-
nović et al., 2020), sociotechnical imaginaries typically cannot
but refer to lacks, deficiencies, failures and problems in the
existing state of affairs. In the case of automobility, several
parallel sociotechnical imaginaries to the autonomous vehicle
sociotechnical imaginary are at work. One such parallel con-
struct is the electric vehicle sociotechnical imaginary, wherein
electric vehicles are being promoted as a solution to climate
change, and death and disease from exhaust emissions. In the
case of the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary, it is
death and injury resulting from road accidents, for which
autonomous vehicles are being promoted as the solution.
Central to the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical narrative is
the assertion that driver error is a causal factor in 93% of
automobile crashes. It is to the construction of this statistic that
we now turn.
The construction of road accident statistics
The statistic that 93% of road crashes are due to “human error”
(or “driver error”) is regularly cited in academic publications
(Salmon et al., 2010; Stanton and Salmon, 2009; Petridou and
Moustaki, 2000), in governmental and inter-governmental
reports (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2015;
International Road Transport Union, 2007), in the mass media
(Times of India, 2019), in reports (Walker-Smith, 2013), at
automobile industry events and company web sites (Mercedes-
Benz, 2020). We here review the institutional origins of this
statistic and its replication in recent studies.
US crash studies. The first of several studies to conclude that
93% of road crashes are due to “human error” was conducted
by the Institute for Research in Public Safety at Indiana Uni-
versity Bloomington, published as the Tri-Level Study of the
Causes of Traffic Accidents (Treat et al., 1977a, 1977b, 1979). In
the body of the report there is some qualification regarding the
contribution of “human error” as a causal factor (Treat et al.,
1977a, p. 28): “conservatively stated, the study indicates human
errors and deficiencies were a cause in at least 64% of accidents,
and were probably causes in about 90–93% of accidents
investigated.” In the Abstract to the Executive Summary (Treat
et al., 1979, Technical Report Documentation Page) it is stated
that “Human factors were cited as probable causes in 92.6% of
accidents investigated…. Environmental factors were cited as
probable causes in 33.8% of these accidents, while vehicular
factors were identified as probable causes in 12.6%.” Rounded
up to 93% in the “Capsule Summary” to the Executive Sum-
mary, it is this latter figure from the Tri-Level Study that is
regularly cited.
Three decades later the 2008 National Motor Vehicle Crash
Causation Survey Report to Congress noted that (United States
Department of Transportation NHTSA, 2008b):
Nearly 30 years have passed since the last on-scene crash
causation study was conducted (the Indiana Tri-Level Study
in 1979). The information from the Indiana Tri-Level Study
is seriously outdated due to the changing nature of the
vehicle fleet and vehicle technologies. Also, since the last
study, driver behaviour has changed due to a variety of
dashboard electronics, also called telematics pertaining to
entertainment, navigation, and communication. Further-
more, the Tri-Level Study was not nationally representative
in that it was only conducted in one small part of the
country and was not based upon a statistical design.
Although critical of some aspects of the earlier Tri-Level Study,
this second study by the US National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) employed a virtually identical empiri-
cal and theoretical framework: causality is assumed to lie within
“the vehicle, the roadway, the environmental conditions, and the
human behavioural factors” (United States Department of
Transportation NHTSA 2008a, p. 2). Crashes were investigated
at the crash scene to collect driver, vehicle, and environment-
related information pertaining to crash occurrence, with a focus
on the role of the driver. The targeted information was captured
mainly through four data elements: movement prior to critical
pre-crash event; critical pre-crash event; critical reason for the
critical pre-crash event; and the crash-associated factors. While
this latter US report is more sophisticated in respect to the data
analysis and, unlike the Tri-Level Study, is based on a
representative sample of the United States, it arrives at similar
estimates (Singh, 2018):
The critical reason, which is the last event in the crash
causal chain, was assigned to the driver in 94 percent
(±2.2%) of the crashes. In about 2 percent (±0.7%) of the
crashes, the critical reason was assigned to a vehicle
component’s failure or degradation, and in 2 percent
(±1.3%) of crashes, it was attributed to the environment
(slick roads, weather, etc.).
European crash studies. From the early 1970s, parallel to the
Indiana University accident causation study, several institutions
in Europe began to investigate the causes and consequences of
road crashes. In the late 1990s the European Automobile Man-
ufacturers Association (ACEA) initiated a European Accident
Causation Survey with the support of the European Commission
and under the auspices of the European Road Safety Federation
(ERSF). Five partners from Germany, Italy, Finland and France
collaborated in the development of a data bank containing
information on accident causes. The methodology follows the
traditional assessment of accidents, locating causality in “human,
road and environmental factors as well as traffic conditions”
(Chenisbest et al., 1998). Although the study does not provide a
summary statistic, a parallel study, the European Truck Accident
Causation Study, funded by the European Commission (EC) and
the International Road Transport Union concluded that “the
main accident cause is linked to human error in 85,2% of all cases
[while] other factors play a minor role” (International Road
Transport Union, 2007, p. 4).
Constructing the facts of road crashes. The ESRF paper begins
with the observation that: “Sufficient information on the causes of
accidents is still lacking, although it is well known that more than
90% are related to human errors” (Chenisbest et al., 1998, p. 415).
Similarly, the Handbook of Traffic Psychology claims that “it is
widely accepted that driver error contributes to more than 90% of
all automobile crashes” (Porter, 2012, p. 73). “Did you know,”
Mercedes-Benz (2020) asks on its web site, “that 60% of people
believe that humans are better drivers than computers?” “At the
same time,” they add, “it is a fact that ninety percent of all
accidents come as a consequence of human error.” That it is
reported as “well known,” “widely accepted” and “a fact” is evi-
dence of the performative success of the statistic, achieved
through its recurrent citation, even in the face of an acknowl-
edged absence of “sufficient information on the causes of acci-
dents.” A summary of the results of The National Motor Vehicle
Crash Causation Survey (Singh, 2015), “Critical Reasons For
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Crashes Investigated in the National Motor Vehicle Crash Cau-
sation Survey,” as of October 18, 2020 had been cited 490 times
according to Google Scholar. The citations are evidence that it is
well known in the sense that the statistic is familiar to some
numerically significant number of people held to be relevant,
which citations ensure it remains well-known. The description of
the statistic as “well known” is at the same time an epistemolo-
gical claim: that it is an empirically established “fact,” proof of
which is its replication across the studies cited above. In short, the
US and European iterations of the statistic have rendered it an
established fact that “human error” is the primary cause of
automobile crashes, albeit with minor quibbling over the precise
percentage.
The construction of the facts begins with the initial formulation
of the study, its parameters, purpose and scope; the construction
of variables and their associated values; the development of a
codebook for translating observations and responses into values
for each variable; the investigative work at the scene of the crash;
the assigning of causes under human, vehicle or environment
variables; the recoding, analysis and interpretation of the data.
There is no empirical study that has taken these routine work
tasks as a topic of investigation (Lynch, 2011, p. 835), but
imagining what such a study would look like allows us to identify
what was required to construct the facts.
Such a “study of the study” would focus on how responses,
observations and other details were entered into the survey
instruments at the scene of the crash; their subsequent coding,
specifically the “ad hoc” procedures for making decisions
according to a rulebook—which in this case is the coding manual
(United States Department of Transportation, 2008)—that
specifies how to categorize and code the information along the
chain through which the data is conveyed (Garfinkel, 1967,
pp. 19–22). Coders—who for the subject at hand includes police
officers, accident fieldworkers and statisticians—as Harold
Garfinkel observed, do the work of coding as socially competent
members. Their social competence derives from their member-
ship in an automobilised society wherein responsibility for
automobility crashes is commonsensically assumed to reside in
either drivers, vehicles or the environment.
That the results of the original Tri-Level Study have been
repeatedly verified is unsurprising, given the later studies have all
employed the same theoretical framework and empirical
assumptions. Entirely untheorized in these studies is a set of
background common-sense assumptions wherein automobility is
assumed to be normal and safe; that “accidents” and automobility
violence are not an intrinsic property of automobility but
contingent. That contingency is assumed to be located in its
components: the driver, the road/environment or the vehicle;
each crash occurring for contingent reasons that can be
accounted for post-hoc, for which there is in principle a
perspective from which the crash can be adequately explained,
even if in each case it may be difficult in practice to do so. While
causes are attributed to either the driver, the vehicle or
environment, which causes are then additively calculated to
provide percentages, no causality is attributed to automobility in
its entirety. While causal aggregates are attributed to drivers,
vehicles and the environment, and while blame and responsibility
may be allocated for each individual crash, automobility in its
totality is not conceptualized as even a possible causal entity.
The remit for these studies might be described thus: “The
individual causal factors that produce automobile crashes are to
be identified, but automobility in its entirety is not to be identified
as a causal factor. Drivers and the environment may be held
responsible, as may one class of vehicles, namely those that can be
identified as ‘defective,’ but not all vehicles.” It is, of course, a
remit unlikely to have ever been explicitly articulated. In the
idiom of speech act theory (Austin, 1965), it is the illocutionary
force of the official remit of studies financed and supported by
automobile manufacturers, states and governmental departments
(Nader, 1972, pp. 199–252) that are fiscally, infrastructurally and
in terms of policy, heavily invested in automobility (see, for
example, University of Michigan Transportation Research
Institute, 2013). As reflected in the first legal cases that dealt
with road “accidents,” “automobiles [were] considered as
fundamentally benign products that were harmful only when
driven negligently” (Lochlann Jain, 2004, p. 65). A similar
assumption is the belief that automobility is neither good nor bad,
that automobiles are simply neutral technologies, that the
problem lies primarily with the users of the technology (see, for
example, Nader, 1972, pp. 208–209). Automobility as a complex
is thus essentially removed from the realm of possible critique;
that it might be “automobility itself” that is the source and cause
of road violence. To so conclude would lead one to what for many
is the unthinkable: that the elimination of automobility related
death and injury would require abolishing automobility. Indeed,
the very concept of automobility, a basic concept within the field
of automobility studies (Böhm et al., 2006, pp. 3–4), is absent in
these studies; there is no “automobility” variable for which even a
simple descriptive statistic could be calculated (see, for example,
Singh, 2008).
There is no reason to doubt that road safety researchers and
advocates are motivated by concern, or doubt that their efforts
have contributed to a reduction of death and injury rates, at least
within western automobilised societies. But in refraining from
critiquing the sui generis entity that is automobility, their efforts
have had minimal, if any, effect on the reproduction and
expansion of automobility across the planet and its accompanying
increasing death and injury rates. Similar to the early days of
automobility when road safety officials concentrated exclusively
on driver education and traffic engineering (Lochlann Jain, 2004;
Bonham, 2006), the policy recommendations in these studies and
reports hold out the continual promise that automobility is
remediable, that automobile death and injury can be massively
reduced, that it is contingent.
Accident causation theory. Steffen Böhm, Campbell Jones, Chris
Land and Matthew Paterson (2006, pp. 4–5) observe that “In
contemporary societies, the car stands in place of automobility
itself.” In the studies cited above it is “the car” under the term
“the vehicle” that stands for automobility. The vehicle is a causal
factor only when technologically defective, against a background
of what are defined as non-defective vehicles. If we take the
estimate in the 1979 study, that “vehicular factors were… prob-
able causes in 12.6% [of crashes]” and invert this statistic, the
claim is that vehicular factors were not probable causes in 87.4%
of cases.
If neither vehicles nor “the environment”—both of which are
undertheorized yet always present, as are drivers—were not
probable causes it would be very strange indeed. To make one of
these the “cause,” a specific theory of accidents is required in
which the accident is defined as “an unsuccessful interaction
between the person, technology and organization” and a
“probable cause” as a critical event that is “the single immediate
precursor to the accident defined to describe an action of a
person” (Thomas et al., 2013b, p. 14). When an accident and a
probable cause are so defined it is unsurprising that automobile
crash studies using such a methodology find precisely what they
are looking for and identify the human as the probable cause in
the overwhelming majority of crashes. An alternative conclusion
to arrive at would be that automobiles (not as artefacts but as
entangled techno-social phenomena) are “probable causes” in
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100% of automobile crashes. Or, more precisely, that it is a
car–driver–environment assemblage entity (Urry, 2006) that is
the causal factor in 100% of automobile crashes.
Aristotle remarked in his Metaphysics (Aristotle and Ross,
1981, VI) that “there is no science” of the accident. With the
emergence of “vehicle accident causation theory” (Thomas et al.,
2013b) such a science for automobility has been developed, with
the goal of identifying the root causes of road accidents. Their
identification, it is assumed, will open possibilities for their
alleviation through improved technologies.
The “natural science of accidents” has its history in the 20th
century. Thomas et al. (2013b, p. 13) note that the first accident
causation model, the domino theory, was developed in the
context of a search for the cause of industrial accidents (Heinrich,
1931). The model accounted for accidents via a simple linear
sequential model: an accident is a misstep in a sequential chain of
events, each dependent on the preceding event. By removing one
of the events the consequences may be avoided and the accident
prevented. Amongst the categories within this model, one is “the
fault of the person,” thus early theories of accident causality
focused on human culpability. Since the 1930s, accident causation
models have modified the original linear, sequential model. The
“Haddon matrix” employed a modified sequential epidemiologi-
cal model to capture the complexity of accidents, assumed to be
caused by a combination of driver, vehicle and infrastructure, for
each of which a pre-crash, crash and post-crash phase can be
identified (Haddon, 1968; Thomas et al., 2013b, p. 13).
Later models conceptualized accidents as possible outcomes
within tightly coupled socio-technical systems in which humans
are assumed to have control and thus the opportunity to adapt
their behaviour, thus the system is able to accommodate adverse
conditions. However, minor human errors can result in accidents
with major outcomes (Thomas et al., 2013b, pp. 13–14).
Addressing road accidents specifically, Reason (2000) pointed to
the different types of “unsafe acts” that are committed by persons
qua components of the system, with human errors and latent
system conditions being identified as root causes. Adding further
complexity to the systems approach, the cognitive reliability and
error analysis method (CREAM) developed by Hollnagel (1998)
conceptualized accidents as “an unsuccessful interaction between
person, technology and organization” (Thomas et al., 2013b,
p. 14).
Following Haddon, this approach points to risks associated
with human behaviour, identifying the critical event as the single
immediate precursor to an accident, which is defined as a (failed)
action by a person. The model identified nine classes of factors
which, together, describe all types of physical interaction within
the complex operation of a sociotechnical system. Each factor is
sub-divided and related to a specific cause, thus the chain of
events can be reconstructed within a causation sequence. All
events are related to further antecedents with a set of predefined
relationships specified by the method. The model allows for the
ascription of a single general causal factor as the root cause of an
accident (Thomas et al., 2013b, p. 14).
Applying the CREAM method to road safety, but substituting
“Cognitive” with “Driver,” M. Ljung (2002) developed a driver
reliability and error analysis method (DREAM). Between 2004
and 2008 the European Commission (Thomas et al., 2013a)
supported the establishment of a European Road Safety
Observatory (ERSO) that involved the development of a new
approach to investigate crash causation for policymaking
purposes (Paulsson, 2005). DREAM in its 3.0 version (Warner
et al., 2008) was adapted and specified as appropriate for traffic
safety analysis. Referred to as “SafetyNet Accident Causation
System” (SNACS), it follows the traditional DVE
(driver–vehicle–environment) schema: “DREAM method has a
Human–Technology–Organization perspective, which implies
that accidents happen when the dynamic interaction between
people, technologies and organizations fails in one way or
another, and that there are a variety of interacting causes creating
the accident” (Paulsson, 2005, pp. 9–10).
Notwithstanding qualifications and disclaimers within the US
and European studies described above, and they are not absent,
the repeated citation of the statistic that 93% of road crashes are
due to “human error” is the ascription of a single general causal
factor as the root cause of 93% of all accidents. Although most
safety studies arrive at the conclusion that human error is the
main cause of accidents, there are many possible instances and
categories of human error.
The development of autonomous vehicles requires that those
errors be identified and that a machine be constructed that is able
to not make the errors that fallible humans make. The Traffic
Accident Causation in Europe (TRACE) project investigated the
different types of “errors” creating a classification model based on
typical “Human Functional Failures” (HFF) present in road
accidents. Failures were delineated by following a sequential
theoretical chain of human functions involved in information
gathering, processing, decision and action. Accidents are
conceptualized as ruptures, occurring when the driver is
confronted with an unexpected difficulty that leads her to lose
control of a situation which until that point was more or less
regulated. HFF is an extreme version of DVE in that the driver is
assumed to be in full control of both vehicle and the environment.
In systems that are imagined as DVEs, it is primarily humans that
cause accidents. Rune Elvik (2004, p. 1) has argued that “if
humans were perfectly rational, and always in perfect control of
hazards that are subject to human control, there would be very
few serious accidents.” It is assumed that external and internal
factors limit human rationality in the control of hazards:
accidents are thus inversely related to learning, human ability
to managing complexity, and the fact that humans have a limited
cognitive capacity, therefore they are prone to failure. If the driver
is taken out, so the argument proceeds in the DVE/HFF model(s),
and the driver–vehicle hybrid is turned into a
vehicle–environment only interaction, accidents will be elimi-
nated or significantly reduced. Accidents in DVE/HFF models are
conceptualized from the vantage point of the driver. Hazards of
the road are to be controlled by rationality inside the car (Fischer
et al., 2020).
Revealing accidents. “[T]o invent the family automobile is to
produce the pile-up on the highway,” Paul Virilio (2007, p. 10)
observed. Following Hannah Arendt, Virilio viewed accidents as
the other side of technology; “profane miracles” that reveal things
that otherwise remain hidden in technology. Road accidents are
not extrinsic to automobility, nor are they errors committed by
the human driver, but are an intrinsic part of automobility
sociotechnical reality. They reveal the essence of automobility: a
violent socio-political order (Böhm et al., 2006, p. 10). Virilio is
not the only one to look at accidents in terms of such a revelation:
Bruno Latour (2005) argues that accidents reveal the agency of
objects as actants; Jean Baudrillard (2005, p. 133) talks of the
“fatum of technology”; and Slavoj Zizek (1989, p. 70) sees them as
a “symptom of modern society.”
This point can be made by drawing an analogy to firearm
fatalities and injuries. While there is a claim that “it is not guns
that kill people but people that kill people,” it seems clear that
while it is possible to kill someone with one’s bare hands, it is
much easier to succeed with a firearm, and it is possible to kill
many more people, the efficacity increasing with the capacity of
the firearm. To suggest that firearms—conceptualized legally as
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“dangerous instrumentality” (Lochlann Jain, 2004), as were
automobiles as early as 1930 in a US Supreme Court decision
(Seo, 2019)—are not a probable cause of death in firearm deaths
is a peculiar argument, yet it is an identical argument to that
found in accident causation research. Automobiles are items of
heavy machinery that move at—and are permitted and
encouraged to move at—speeds lethal to humans and, for that
matter, animals (Davenport and Davenport, 2006, pp. 165–189).
Analogously to the situation with firearms, it is very difficult for a
person moving through her own efforts to travel at a velocity that
is lethal to others.
It is not by chance that autonomous vehicle development is
heralded as a solution to the problem of road crashes and has
been promoted as the solution within traditional accident
causation models (Litman, 2019; Singh, 2015). To identify what
is revealed in automobility accidents requires more than to
determine what “causes” them. Taking accidents seriously
necessitates conceptualizing them not as “human failures” or as
flaws in an otherwise functioning system but as inseparable from
speed, not only that of the automobile but the speed in which the
unexpected (the “accidens”) occurs (Virilio, 2007, p. 12). It is the
“virtual speed of the catastrophic surprise” that lies at the centre
of every accident. Virilio advises us to look at “what lies beneath
the engineer’s awareness as producer.” What lies there is the
coder, working with codebooks and a model that creates an
abstraction composed of discreet variables, which mathematical
abstraction is not only substituted for the phenomenological
reality of the accident, it is assumed to be reality (Husserl, 1970,
pp. 48–49). It is a model of an in principle flawless system, which
would so work if all drivers were perfect drivers. The autonomous
vehicle sociotechnical imaginary is a vision of such a driver—it is
a machine (Randell, 2017, pp. 672–673). It is a machine we are
being urged to accept on the basis of the assurances of automobile
and technology manufacturers and associated interests. It is a
sociotechnical imaginary constructed by coders and codebooks,
further developed and co-created by a confluence of engineering,
corporate and state interests (Urry, 2016).
Discussion
Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla, Inc., once proffered the following
opinion of public transportation (Marshall, 2017):
I think public transport is painful. It sucks. Why do you
want to get on something with a lot of other people, that
doesn’t leave where you want it to leave, doesn’t start where
you want it to start, doesn’t end where you want it to end?
And it doesn’t go all the time. It’s a pain in the ass. That’s
why everyone doesn’t like it. And there’s like a bunch of
random strangers, one of who might be a serial killer, OK,
great. And so that’s why people like individualized
transport, that goes where you want, when you want.
While one of those strangers might be a serial killer, if there is a
certain serial killer, as Musk himself has elsewhere acknowledged,
it is the automobile (Lowensohn, 2015). Globally, someone is
killed by direct impact with an automobile every 25 s, ~3500 every
day. In the United States, Musk’s country of residence, almost
40,000 people are killed annually. This normality is part of the
background against which road safety research is conducted and
policy discussions take place (Culver, 2018).
Perusing the codebooks of the studies discussed above, as well
as road safety publications such as those occasionally released by
the World Health Organization (2004) and the Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (2008), what is
striking is the extraordinary number of things that can go wrong
on the road. In focusing on producing a number, a percentage, for
each of the three ostensible crash causes, sight of the forest
(automobility) has been obscured by the trees (variables). That
road safety recommendations have to some degree reduced death
and injury does not negate this assessment. One policy recom-
mendation that would follow from the above studies would be
that the only meaningfully significant way to prevent auto-
mobility death and injury is to substitute automobility with safe
transportation alternatives; that we need to move to a post-
automobility world. Instead, the conclusion that has been drawn
is that there are three causal components within each crash—
driver, vehicle and environment—each of which is in principle
remediable.
Hannah Arendt (1973, p. vii) remarked on the first pages of
Origins of Totalitarianism that “Progress and Doom are two sides
of the same medal… both are articles of superstition, not of faith.”
Virilio (2007, p. 11) refers to the “eschatological dimension of the
calamities caused by the positivist ideology of Progress.” Nowhere
is this clearer than in the eschatological dimensions of auto-
mobility: the 1,250,000 people killed each year and the 50,000,000
that are seriously injured annually (World Health Organization,
2015) in automobile accidents. “Violence” is the appropriate term
to describe road death and injury (Furnas, 1935; Watkins-
Hughes, 2009). Road accidents cause physical trauma. Injuries
result in death, severe disability, inability to work, chronic pain
and repercussions for family life and psychological well-being. In
the same way that to simply say that people “died” during the
Holocaust rather than that they were murdered is an inadequate
description (Volmert, 2017, p. 6), similarly the word “violence” is
the appropriate term to describe what routinely occurs on roads
across the Earth.
More people are killed in road crashes than from any other
form of violent death, war included. Since the first death of a
pedestrian, Bridget Driscoll, in London in 1896 (The Manchester
Guardian, 1896), ~85 million people have been killed in what are
commonly referred to as automobile “accidents”: roughly 60
million in the 20th century and 25 million to date in the first two
decades of the 21st century. To provide some comparison, around
66 million people were killed in World War II. Automobility is
arguably the most violent socio-political order on Earth. There is
no other area of social or political life where such a constant,
routine and violent attrition of human life and the destruction of
the human body is considered normal and acceptable (Paterson,
2007, p. 41). We submit that the appropriate conclusion to draw
from the data collected by the accident studies is that auto-
mobility is irremediably violent.
Automobility is a moral economy wherein automobile manu-
facturers in particular and the automotive industry in general
have been relieved of all responsibility for this ongoing calamity,
enabled by the research described above and its recurrent citation
that locates the cause within the driver. This has in part been
achieved through automobile interests having successfully
appropriated ownership of “the problem.” They own it in the
sense that they have been able to define the problem, which
problem has been constructed as the human driver (Bucsuházy
et al., 2020; Rolison et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018). It is a problem
jointly owned with road safety researchers, co-owners of the
problem in the sense identified by Joseph Gusfield (1989) as it is
road safety researchers and automobile manufacturers that are
typically consulted when road safety issues become a topic in the
current news cycle.
In defining the problem as the driver, the automobile industry
has at the same time been able to disavow ownership in the sense
of responsibility. Only to the degree they make faulty vehicles is
the automobile industry held responsible. Examples are the Ford
Pinto and, more recently, Toyota vehicles that unexpectedly
accelerated. While financially detrimental to Ford and Toyota,
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these events serve a useful purpose for automobile manufacturers
as a whole; they convince us that all other vehicles leave factories
in a normal and safe condition. This is the background against
which an individual vehicle (for example, due to inadequate
maintenance) or a class of vehicle (such as a Ford Pinto) can be
categorized as “defective,” thereby allowing all other vehicles to be
categorizable as non-defective, hence not causal factors, precisely
as categorized in the studies described above.
Conclusion
While it is possible to identify at a general level the processes,
agents, and activities essential to the construction of the road
crash statistics discussed in this paper, we noted above that a
detailed study of road safety studies has yet to be undertaken.
Such a reflexive study would begin with a reconstruction of the
initial formulation of the research project and its methodology,
accompany police and any other on scene coders, trace the
recoding of variables and their analysis, and document the
“writing up” and subsequent dissemination of public documents
and reports. Further research at this level of detail would con-
tribute to identifying how, precisely, this widely cited and repli-
cated statistic has been and continues to be routinely reproduced
within a realist epistemology as a “well known” and “widely
accepted” fact.
The autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary is a socio-
technical imaginary that assures us that a solution has been found
to the problem of massive automobile death and injury. Through
the promises contained within its publicly performed visions, it
constructs an imaginary world in the future perfect tense wherein
one of the many problems of automobility has been solved. It
provides a ready-made rejoinder to automobility’s critics. It is a
vision promoted and supported by the automobile industry and
related interests, amongst which interests their capital accumu-
lation prospects are not incidental (Paterson, 2007); aided by
states that are no less interested (Manderscheid, 2012, 2014). The
current model, theory and application of road accident causation
both supports and reflects this vision. It is yet to be seen whether
a new model could be developed based on sociotechnical ima-
ginaries that lay outside of the dominant engineering-business
paradigm referred to earlier. One such alternative model would be
a phenomenological approach to road accidents, focusing on
embodied experience, perception and action (Merleau-Ponty,
1992) and the situatedness of the habituated practices that result
in accidents. In addition to documenting experiences related to
actual events (“accidents”), it would focus on non-events (near
accidents, accident-like setups). Such an approach would provide
grounds for rethinking experience, agency and risks in our
knowledge of road violence. Clearly, more research on accidents
and road violence based on alternative epistemic constructs (Ihde,
2009) is required.
The success of the many automobility sociotechnical imagin-
aries of the past and the present is dependent upon convincing us
that there are no alternatives; that automobility pasts and futures
are determined by technological innovations; that those pasts and
envisaged futures are not the outcome of political strategies and
decisions. Yet there are alternative sociotechnical imaginaries
(Jasanoff, 2015, p. 4) based on responsibility, acceptance and co-
creation (Graf and Sonnberger, 2020); citizen engagement and
participatory deliberation in innovation (Mladenović et al., 2020);
and criticism of automobility violence and injustice (Culver,
2018).
The autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary is a complex
of publicly performed visions (Jasanoff, 2015) embedded in an
engineering-business paradigm and grounded in technological
determinism. The autonomous vehicle sociotechnical imaginary,
like the automobility sociotechnical imaginaries of the past as well
as those contemporaneous with it, most notably the electric
vehicle sociotechnical imaginary, will contribute to ensuring the
reproduction of the automobility regime under which we live; a
regime of continued production of more automobiles and more
automobility infrastructure. It is not a radically different future,
nor is it even a radically different imaginary. It is a sociotechnical
imaginary that ensures in the present the social reproduction and
further expansion of automobility. It will result in nothing more
than more of the same: namely, more automobility.
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Notes
1 Within industry and government discourses and publications, autonomous vehicles
are frequently seen as one component of a multidimensional connected autonomous
vehicle future. It is, however, a sociotechnical imaginary that exists on the margins of
public awareness, for which reason our focus is the autonomous vehicle sociotechnical
imaginary. We here restrict ourselves to noting that multidimensional connectedness
augments social reality in multiple ways (Castells, 2009). By transforming the imagined
humans of the future from one component of a car–driver cyborg entity (Randell,
2017) into car–consumers divested of agency, they are likely to become, as Avigail
Ferdman (2020) has argued, not only passive riders but hyper-consumers within a
hyper-connected “attention-economy,” allowing mobility providers to capitalize on the
in-vehicle attention of passengers.
2 The focus of this paper is not the technology but the sociotechnical imaginary as
publicly described and envisaged. Throughout this paper we use the term
“autonomous” not because we believe these vehicles are or will be “autonomous” (or
“self-driving,” which we take to be a synonym) but because this is the term typically
used to describe them (e.g., Alonso Raposo, 2019).
3 Within road safety discourses the term “accident” has increasingly been replaced by
the term “crash.” We employ both terms throughout this paper, depending on the
context, but the theoretical focus of the paper is “the accident,” not “crashes.”
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